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A Closer Look at the Frame-of-Reference Effect in Personality Scale
Scores and Validity
Filip Lievens, Wilfried De Corte, and Eveline Schollaert
Ghent University
This article contributes to the understanding of why the use of a frame-of-reference leads to increased
criterion-related validity of personality inventories. Two competing explanations are described and
tested. A between-subjects (N  337) and a within-subject (N  105) study are conducted to test the
hypothesized effects of use of a frame of reference on reliability and validity. Regarding the effects on
reliability, use of a frame of reference reduces within-person inconsistency (instead of between-person
variability) in responding to generic items. Use of a frame of reference further leads to higher validity
as a result of the reduction of between-person variability and within-person inconsistency. Yet, reducing
these inconsistencies is not enough. It is also important to use a frame of reference that is conceptually
relevant to the criterion. Besides implications for contextualized personality inventories, these results
provide an explanation for the moderate validities of generic personality inventories.
Keywords: frame of reference, personality scales, criterion-related validity, reliability, item responding
In the personality domain, recent research has experimented
with the use of more contextualization in items. In particular, it has
been argued that the common use of generic (or noncontextual-
ized) personality items (e.g., “I pay attention to details”) is one
reason for the relatively low criterion-related validities of person-
ality scales (Bing, Whanger, Davison, & VanHook, 2004; Schmit,
Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995). Therefore, contextualized per-
sonality inventories impose a specific frame of reference (e.g., “I
pay attention to details at work”) on test takers when responding to
personality items. Empirical research has found considerable sup-
port for the use of a frame of reference as a way of improving the
criterion-related validity of personality scales (Bing et al., 2004;
Holtz, Ployhart, & Dominguez, 2005; Hunthausen, Truxillo,
Bauer, & Hammer, 2003; Robie, Schmit, Ryan, & Zickar, 2000;
Schmit et al., 1995).
However, a fundamental question has remained unanswered: Why
is the criterion-related validity of contextualized personality invento-
ries higher than that of noncontextualized personality inventories?
Traditionally, it is assumed that use of a frame of reference increases
reliability by reducing between-person inconsistency in item interpre-
tation (Bing et al., 2004; Holtz et al., 2005). This reduction in
between-person inconsistency is then also assumed to increase
criterion-related validity. This study contrasts this traditional expla-
nation with an alternative explanation of how provision of a frame of
reference might lead to higher validity. For each explanation, we
outline the rationale, theoretical background, and hypothesized effects
on reliability and validity. Next, we used a between-subjects and
within-subject design to test the explanations.
Prior Research on the Frame-of-Reference Effect
Conceptually, the use of contextualized personality scales is
based on the cognitive-affective system theory of personality (Mis-
chel & Shoda, 1995). This theory posits that cross-situationally
consistent behavior can be expected only when situations elicit
psychologically similar cues and demands. As individuals’ behav-
iors are conditional on the situation, Wright and Mischel (1987)
referred to the underlying tendencies as conditional dispositions.
The key measurement implication of this theory is that prediction
of people’s behavior can be improved when people are given a
context, or frame-of-reference, when asked to describe themselves.
Empirically, prior research has found considerable support for
the frame-of-reference effect in personality scales and criterion-
related validities. The original study of Schmit et al. (1995) ex-
amined the frame-of-reference effect in a student setting. These
authors hypothesized that use of a frame of reference would lead
to more positive scale scores as compared with a noncontextual-
ized format, because behavioral expectations are more constrained
in specific contexts than in general. Furthermore, they expected an
at-school frame of reference to increase the criterion-related va-
lidity of a Conscientiousness factor for predicting grade point
average (GPA). Both hypotheses were confirmed. In another
study, Robie et al. (2000) examined the impact of use of a frame
of reference on the measurement properties of the Revised NEO
Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R). Results showed more error
variance in ratings when no frame of reference was used. Hunt-
hausen et al. (2003) investigated the effects of frame-of-reference
use on validity in a field setting. An at-work frame of reference
moderated the validity of two Five-Factor Model factors (Extra-
version and Openness) for predicting the job performance of
customer service managers. These frame-of-reference scales also
had incremental validity over cognitive ability. Whereas all prior
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studies had used a between-subjects design, Bing et al. (2004) used
a within-subject design, in which students were asked to complete
both generic and contextualized personality inventories. Contex-
tualized versions had incremental validity over noncontextualized
versions and cognitive ability. Finally, Holtz et al. (2005) focused
on test perceptions. They expected that candidates would have
more positive face validity perceptions of contextualized invento-
ries. However, there was no effect of frame of reference on
students’ perceptions.
Explanations of the Frame-of-Reference Effect
Traditional Explanation
The traditional explanation posits that adding a frame of refer-
ence reduces between-person variability in responding to generic
personality items. According to this traditional explanation, test
takers who respond to a generic personality inventory might be
divided into different subgroups. Some test takers rate all generic
items with a specific frame of reference, whereas other test takers
use a different frame of reference across all generic items. Yet, it
is assumed that each test taker consistently uses the same frame of
reference across all items. For example, Holtz et al. (2005) noted,
“It is thought that when global personality items are used, it is
difficult to predict what cues individuals will focus on. Some
test-takers may respond in accordance with how they perceive
their personality across situations while others may respond spe-
cifically to how they view themselves at work, home, or elsewhere
[italics added]” (p. 76, see also Schmit et al., 1995, pp. 607–608).
A contextualized personality inventory is thought to reduce this
between-person variability in the frame of reference adopted, as all
groups are asked to conceptualize the items with an imposed frame
of reference.
This traditional explanation can be visualized in a model, such
as the one presented in Figure 1. This diagram shows that two (in
this simplified example) latent variables influence item responses.
For example, the first latent variable might be Conscientiousness
(or any other personality trait) at school, and the second might be
Conscientiousness (or any other personality trait) at work. For
some test takers, the true model contains large loadings from the
two items (in this simplified example) on the first latent variable
but not on the second latent variable (top of Figure 1), whereas for
other test takers, the opposite is true (bottom of Figure 1).
There is some support for the contention that test takers com-
pleting personality inventories can be divided into different
groups. Most of this research has taken a person-centered approach
wherein respondents (instead of items) served as variables and
were clustered according to their personality scores (e.g.,
Asendorpf, Borkenau, Ostendorf, & Van Aken, 2001; De Fruyt,
2002). In addition, and more relevant to the current study, other
research has tried to uncover groups of respondents on the basis of
their response styles. Along these lines, different subgroups of
respondents (regular responders, slight fakers, extreme fakers, etc.)
have been identified (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998;
Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004; see also McFarland & Ryan, 2000).
Finally, there is evidence that test takers can be distinguished in
terms of the strategies used to respond to personality items. Some
test takers relate items to previous experiences and behaviors,
whereas other test takers think about how relevant others have
characterized them with respect to the trait-relevant behavior men-
tioned (Gordon & Holden, 1998). The common thread running
through these studies is that test takers can be distinguished on the
basis of their response styles and strategies. Likewise, the tradi-
tional explanation assumes that test takers might differ in the
specific frame of reference (at work, at home, at school, etc.) they
adopt to answer items of a generic personality inventory (Bing et
al., 2004).
According to the traditional explanation, the reliability of con-
textualized personality inventories is higher than that of noncon-
textualized personality inventories because between-person vari-
ability in the frame of reference used is reduced. Further, it is
hypothesized that this reduction in between-person variability sub-
sequently leads to an increase in validity. These assumptions are
reflected in the following quotation from Bing et al. (2004):
Noncontextualized personality items are open to interpretation by
respondents in comparison to context-specific items. As a result, when
answering test items, one respondent may consider the way he or she
behaves at work, and another respondent may consider the way he or
she behaves in social situations; thus these respondents, in essence,
are not responding to the same item when taking into account their
differences in item interpretation. Such differences in item interpre-
tation lead to increases in measurement error and subsequent reduc-
tions in validity [italics added]. (p. 151)
Group 1 
Item 1 
At-school
frame of reference
GPA
Item 2 
Group 2 
At-work
frame of reference
Item 1 
GPA
Item 2 
Figure 1. Example model of between-person variability in responding to generic personality items. GPA 
grade point average.
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Alternative Explanation
Although the aforementioned arguments have traditionally been
used to explain the effects of using a contextualized frame of
reference, there may be an alternative explanation. Specifically,
imposing a frame of reference might reduce two different sources
of variability: between-person variability and within-person incon-
sistency. In the remainder, we discuss the hypothesized effects of
these sources of variability on reliability and validity. Hereby, we
make the simplifying assumptions that test takers use only two
frames of reference in responding to generic items and that these
items are parallel measures of the underlying personality traits.
Similar to the traditional explanation, the alternative explanation
posits that between-person variability is relevant when comparing
generic with contextualized personality inventories. However,
contrary to the traditional explanation, the effects of between-
person variability on reliability are hypothesized to be minimal.
This hypothesis is based on the formula of the specific index (i.e.,
Cronbach alpha) that is typically used to compute reliability (Mur-
phy & Davidshofer, 2001). Cronbach alpha is only minimally
affected by between-person variability as long as (a) test takers are
consistent within themselves in their usage of a frame of reference
and (b) the reliabilities of the separate frames of reference used are
relatively similar. When test takers differ in the frame of reference
used (while being consistent within themselves), the item (co)vari-
ances in the total sample will be a weighted sum (across different
test takers) of the (co)variances of items that are all rated with a
similar frame of reference. When the reliabilities, and thus the
item, (co)variances of the frames of reference are similar, then any
weighted sum of the within frame-of-reference item (co)variances
will deviate only marginally from these within frame-of-reference
item (co)variances themselves.
Similar to the traditional explanation, the alternative explanation
hypothesizes that between-person variability in the frame of ref-
erence adopted might impact on validity. The reasoning is that the
criterion-related validity of a generic personality inventory will
increase when people interpret the items using a frame of reference
that shows conceptual overlap with the criterion (i.e., correct frame
of reference). Conversely, the validity will decrease when people
interpret generic items using a frame of reference that does not
show conceptual overlap with the criterion (i.e., incorrect frame of
reference). In the context of completing a generic personality
inventory, one might then expect that validity will be positively
related to the number of people who use a correct frame of
reference (i.e., a frame of reference that conceptually overlaps with
the criterion). Essentially, this reasoning builds on the common
notion that validity is related to conceptually matching the predic-
tor and the criterion (Binning & Barrett, 1989; Goldstein, Zedeck,
& Goldstein, 2002; Warr, 2000). For instance, a well-known
example is that cognitive criteria are best predicted by cognitively
oriented selection procedures, whereas noncognitive criteria are
best predicted by noncognitively oriented selection procedures
(see also Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993; Lievens,
Buyse, & Sackett, 2005).
Apart from between-person variability, the alternative explana-
tion also posits that contextualized personality inventories reduce
within-person inconsistency in the frame of reference adopted.
This inconsistency stems from a test taker’s use of one frame of
reference to answer one generic item and another frame of refer-
ence to answer another item. Thus, there might be within-person
inconsistency in terms of the number of items rated with specific
frames of reference. An example of such a model is represented in
Figure 2. In this model, test takers interpret half of the items with
an at-school frame of reference and the other half with an at-work
frame of reference. This represents only one scenario, as test takers
might also interpret 10%, 20%, and so forth of the items with
differing frames of reference. A contextualized personality inven-
tory is then expected to reduce this within-person inconsistency in
the frame of reference adopted across items.
Conceptually, the notion of within-person inconsistency in the
frame of reference adopted assumes that test takers think about
each separate item when they respond to personality items, which
is supported by think-aloud studies (Rogers, 1974a, 1974b) and by
research on item context effects (Knowles, 1988; McFarland,
Ryan, & Ellis, 2002). Specifically, within-person inconsistencies
are in line with schematic theories of item responding (Holden,
Fekken, & Cotton, 1990). According to schema theory, a respon-
dent compares the content of each test item with a cognitive
schema (Aronson & Reilly, 2006). This schema provides a cogni-
tive context for processing relevant self-information. In particular,
respondents will use the schema to conduct a selective memory
search to find self-related information. There is ample evidence
that respondents will then typically choose autobiographical mem-
ories that serve them best (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Sanitioso,
Kunda, & Fong, 1990; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). As a generic
personality inventory consists of many different items, it can be
assumed that not all items activate the same schemata. Hence,
Item 1 
At-school
frame of reference
Item 2 GPA
Item 3 
At-work
frame of reference
Item 4 
Figure 2. Example model of within-person inconsistency in responding to generic personality items. GPA 
grade point average.
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people might use different schemata (frames of reference) from
one item to another for selecting relevant self-information.
According to the alternative explanation, within-person incon-
sistency is hypothesized to affect internal consistency reliability. If
items are rated from a different perspective (frame of reference) by
a test taker, the covariance among these items will be essentially a
covariance between “different” items. Next, it is hypothesized that
reliability will not be linearly affected by between-person variabil-
ity. As reliability refers to consistency of measurement (regardless
of what one measures; Schmidt, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2000),
reliability will be negligibly affected when the majority of items
are rated with a specific frame of reference. Conversely, reliability
will be affected when about half of the items are rated with one
frame of reference and half of the items with another frame of
reference, because respondents are then the most inconsistent
within themselves. Thus, there will be a curvilinear relationship
between the number of items rated with a specific frame of
reference and reliability.
With regard to validity, the number of items rated with a specific
frame of reference is posited to have large effects on validity.
Again, the notion of conceptual overlap (Binning & Barrett, 1989;
Goldstein et al., 2002) serves as a basis of this hypothesis. Using
the correct frame of reference for a large number of items will
increase validity, whereas the opposite will be true for using an
incorrect frame of reference for a large number of items. Thus,
validity will be positively related to the number of items that is
rated with a correct frame of reference.
Summary
Taken together, the differences between the alternative expla-
nation and the traditional explanation are threefold. First, the
traditional explanation deals only with between-person variability
in the frame of reference adopted. Conversely, the alternative
explanation addresses both between-person variability and within-
person inconsistency in the frame of reference adopted. Second,
the traditional explanation suggests that reducing between-person
variability will lead to an increase in reliability. The alternative
explanation posits that reduction of between-person variability will
not lead to an increase in reliability. Instead, the alternative expla-
nation posits that within-person inconsistency will affect reliabil-
ity. Third, according to the traditional explanation, reducing
between-person variability is the sole explanation for the increase
in criterion-related validity obtained with contextualized person-
ality inventories. In opposition, the alternative explanation posits
that reducing both between-person variability and within-person
inconsistency leads to the increased validity of contextualized
personality inventories.
Overview of Studies
We conducted two studies to test the rival explanations related
to the frame-of-reference effect in personality inventories. The first
study focused on between-person variability in the frame of ref-
erence adopted in all items and examined the two explanations’
competing hypotheses with regard to the effects of between-person
variability on reliability and validity. To this end, we used a
between-subjects design in the first study, wherein participants
were randomly assigned to three conditions: (a) a noncontextual-
ized/generic condition, (b) a contextualized/frame-of-reference
condition (at school), and (c) a contextualized/frame-of-reference
condition (at work). As the criterion measure was academic per-
formance (GPA), the at-school context conceptually overlapped
with the criterion and therefore constituted the correct frame of
reference, whereas the at-work context represented the incorrect
frame of reference.
The second study focused on within-person inconsistency in the
frame of reference adopted across items and examined its effect on
reliability and validity, as hypothesized by the alternative expla-
nation. To this end, we used a within-subject design in the second
study. Again, GPA served as criterion measure. In this study,
participants completed a personality inventory with both an at-
school (correct) frame of reference and an at-work (incorrect)
frame of reference.
Study 1
Method
Sample and Procedure
The sample consisted of 337 students who were in their final
year in college. The participants were predominantly students
majoring in law, economics, and social sciences. Of the sample,
33% were male and 67% were female. Mean age was 22 years
(SD  2 years). Virtually all participants had considerable work
experience (student jobs, summer jobs); the mean number of jobs
held was 4.
Participants were recruited by an invitation e-mail for a prepa-
ration session on psychological testing and assessment. They could
subscribe to either an Internet-based session or a paper-and-pencil
session. At the start of the session, participants were given the
explanation that the advantage of taking part in this session was
that they could increase their experience with taking a variety of
tests. Next, participants completed a series of psychological tests.
Although these tests differed somewhat across administration
modes (e.g., a cognitive ability test and a situational judgment test
were included in the paper-and-pencil session, whereas an
Internet-based in-basket was included in the Internet-based ses-
sion), a short resume (assessing demographic variables and GPA)
and a personality inventory were always included as the first two
parts of the session. Of the various tests, only participants’ re-
sponses to the personality inventory were used in this study. We
examined whether the personality scale scores and validities dif-
fered across administration mode and found no significant differ-
ences. A couple of weeks later, participants received feedback
about their test results via e-mail.
Design and Manipulations
Students were randomly assigned to three conditions. In the
generic condition, participants did not receive instructions to com-
plete the personality scales with a specific frame of reference in
mind. They simply received the standard instructions. The two
contextualized conditions (at school and at work) were operation-
alized by specific instructions provided to participants. Similar to
Hunthausen et al. (2003), we did not add context tags after each
item but added the context (either at work or at school) before and
during the administration. For example, in the contextualized
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at-school condition, participants were instructed to think about
how they were at school when responding to each statement. When
turning a page, a reminder was also inserted to emphasize that
participants should think about how they behaved at school when
responding to the items. The contextualized at-work condition was
operationalized in a similar way.
As a manipulation check, we asked which frame of reference
(general, at work, or at school) participants had used. Thirty-three
(10%) participants were removed across the contextualized condi-
tions because they had left the manipulation check item blank,
indicated multiple frames of reference, or indicated a different
frame of reference than the one of their designated condition. This
reduced the sample to 304 participants.
Personality Scales
The Big Five personality traits were assessed with Goldberg’s
(1999) 50-item International Personality Item Pool. The scale is
composed of 10 (positively worded or negatively worded) state-
ments related to the respondent’s standing on each of the Big Five
traits: Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, Emotional Sta-
bility, Extraversion, and Agreeableness. Respondents are asked to
indicate how accurately each statement describes them, using a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very
accurate). A composite score was computed by summing the items
related to a given trait. Goldberg (1999) reported the mean coef-
ficient alpha for each of the five scales (10 items each) as .84,
indicating an acceptable degree of internal consistency. Our data
were consistent with this finding, with alphas of .81, .76, .89, .88,
and .84, respectively, for the five scales (see diagonal of Table 1).
Apart from the Big Five factors, we also measured two specific
facets of Conscientiousness (i.e., Achievement Striving and Self-
Discipline) because these facets have been found to be especially
predictive of academic performance (e.g., De Fruyt & Mervielde,
1996; Schmit et al., 1995). Both of these Conscientiousness facets
were measured with 10 statements taken from Goldberg’s (1999)
International Personality Item Pool. Response instructions were
the same as for the Big Five factors.
Similar to Robie et al. (2000), we conducted a pilot study to
check whether all 70 items used (50 Big Five items, 10 items
associated with Achievement Striving, and 10 items related to
Self-discipline) could be situated in general, work, and school
contexts. As a result, 2 of the 70 items (both were Extraversion
statements, namely, “I am the life of the party” and “I talk to a lot
of different people at parties”) were replaced by other Extraversion
statements (“I make friends easily” and “I know how to captivate
people”) from the International Personality Item Pool that were
relevant in different contexts.
Criterion
As our study was situated in an educational context, cumulative
GPA served as the criterion measure. GPA was measured on a
scale ranging from 0 to 4, with higher scores indicating better
grades. Cumulative GPA was obtained from 282 (93%) partici-
pants by self-report (as part of the process of completing their
resume). Although it would have been preferable to gather stu-
dents’ GPAs through university records, it has been demonstrated
that self-reported GPA and GPA obtained from university records
are highly correlated (.91; see Schmitt et al., 2003). With respect
to the reliability of this criterion, GPA correlated strongly across
years, with correlations between GPAs across years around .70.
These values are similar to the values found in a meta-analysis on
the temporal stability of GPA (Vey et al., 2003).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of Study 1 variables
collapsed across all conditions. The broad factor of Conscientious-
ness (.19) and the two Conscientiousness facet scales (.22 and .18
for Achievement Striving and Self-Discipline, respectively) were
significant predictors. These results are consistent with previous
research on the validity of personality scales in educational set-
tings (e.g., De Fruyt & Mervielde, 1996; Schmit et al., 1995). In
addition, the correlation between Achievement Striving and Con-
scientiousness was .58. Self-Discipline correlated .70 with Con-
scientiousness. The intercorrelation between Achievement Striv-
ing and Self-Discipline was .73. These intercorrelations are in line
with the meta-analytic values reported in Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki,
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Study 1 Variables
Variable M SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Predictor
1. Achievement 39.17 5.13 .82
2. Self-discipline 35.19 7.33 .91 .73**
3. ES 35.13 7.03 .89 .06 .20**
4. O 35.01 6.48 .76 .25** .16** .26**
5. E 36.67 4.75 .88 .25** .07 .12** .28**
6. A 41.50 4.63 .84 .30** .15** .02 .22** .16**
7. C 38.70 5.44 .81 .58** .70** .05 .02 .02 .26**
Criterion
8. GPA 1.55 0.61 .22** .18** .01 .03 .04 .02 .19**
Note. N  304 for the correlations among the predictors; N  282 for the correlations with the criterion. ES  Emotional Stability; O  Openness to
Experience; E Extraversion; A Agreeableness; C Conscientiousness; GPA grade point average. Internal consistencies are shown on the diagonal.
For the criterion, the temporal consistency is given on the diagonal.
** p  .01.
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and Cortina (2006). Thus, the current results show that the per-
sonality inventory performed in a manner similar to that expected.
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the
personality scales broken down by condition. For all personality
scales, a small effect size was observed (partial eta squared varying
from .01 to .09). With the exception of Agreeableness, the work-
related frame of reference produced the highest scale scores. This
confirms the results of Schmit et al. (1995) that the use of specific
contexts in personality scales restricts the appropriate behavior to
be elicited as compared with a generic context.
Table 3 presents the internal consistency coefficients (Cronbach
alphas) across conditions. To determine whether the Cronbach
alphas were significantly different across conditions, we used Feldt
and Ankenmann’s (1998) test. There were no significant differ-
ences between the internal consistencies in the generic condition
and the consistencies in the contextualized conditions for any of
the personality scale scores.
Criterion-related validities of the personality scales broken
down per condition are presented in Table 3. Criterion-related
validities were highest for the group of participants who were
randomly assigned to the at-school frame of reference (correct
frame of reference). The differences between the at-school frame
of reference and the other conditions were largest for conceptually
relevant traits (i.e., traits that have been found to be related to the
criterion of academic performance), namely, Conscientiousness
(.37 vs. .09 and .16), Achievement Striving (.41 vs. .16 and .12),
and Self-Discipline (.34 vs. .16 and .06). For the other traits, there
were no significant differences across the conditions.
Study 1 had three key findings. First, reduction of between-
person variability (by imposing a frame of reference) did not affect
internal consistency reliability. The reliability of the contextual-
ized personality inventories was not higher than that of the generic
personality inventory. This result is not in line with the traditional
explanation. Instead, it supports the alternative explanation, which
posited that reliability would not be affected as long as individuals
are consistent within themselves and as long as the frames of
reference used have comparable reliabilities. Second, reliabilities
did not differ significantly across conditions, whereas validities did
differ significantly. Therefore, reduction of between-person vari-
ability cannot be the only explanation for the validity increase of
contextualized personality inventories. This conclusion also con-
tradicts predictions of the traditional explanation. Third, reducing
between-person variability by imposing a frame of reference on
participants had beneficial effects only on the contextualization
that matched the criterion (in this case, the at-school contextual-
ization) for conceptually relevant broad factors (Conscientious-
ness) and conceptually relevant facets (Self-Discipline and
Achievement Striving). This highlights the importance of reducing
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes of Study 1 Variables Broken Down by Condition
Variable
Generic (n  115) At school (n  91) At work (n  98)
p
Partial eta
squaredM SD M SD M SD
Achievement 38.64 4.98 37.99 5.24 40.90 4.79 .00 .06
Self-discipline 34.61 7.07 32.69 7.01 38.19 6.94 .00 .09
ES 34.29 7.61 34.78 7.23 36.45 5.94 .07 .02
E 34.02 6.32 34.57 6.74 36.58 6.18 .01 .03
O 36.87 5.23 35.82 4.71 37.23 4.08 .11 .01
A 42.15 4.74 40.57 4.68 41.59 4.36 .05 .02
C 38.37 5.20 37.76 5.42 39.97 5.56 .01 .03
GPA 1.56 0.58 1.53 0.64 1.54 0.64 .91 .00
Note. Values of significance test and partial eta squared are obtained from analyses of variance. ES  Emotional Stability; E  Extraversion; O 
Openness to Experience; A  Agreeableness; C  Conscientiousness; GPA  grade point average.
Table 3
Internal Consistencies and Criterion-related Validities of Personality Scale Scores Broken Down by Condition
Variable
Reliability Validity
Generic
(n  115)
At school
(n  91)
At work
(n  98)
Generic
(n  110)
At school
(n  83)
At work
(n  89)
Achievement .79a .82a .85a .16b .41a .12b
Self-discipline .89a .90a .91a .16a .34a .06b
ES .91a .90a .86a .06a .09a .13a
E .88a .89a .87a .04a .06a .19a
O .82a .76a .70a .12a .03a .06a
A .84a .84a .84a .02a .05a .09a
C .78a .79a .84a .09b .37a .16a
Note. Alphas with different subscripts in the same row indicate significant differences across conditions at p  .05. These were computed on the basis
of the test in Feldt and Ankenmann (1998, p. 171). Correlations with different subscripts in the same row indicate significant differences across conditions
at p  .05. ES  Emotional Stability; E  Extraversion; O  Openness to Experience; A  Agreeableness; C  Conscientiousness.
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between-person variability (a measurement issue) in such a way
that test takers interpret items with a frame of reference that
conceptually overlaps with the criterion (a substantive issue).
As the results of Study 1 were consistent with the alternative
explanation, Study 2 focused entirely on the alternative explana-
tion, examining whether the two proposed sources of variance
(between-person variability and within-person inconsistency) had
the hypothesized effects on reliability and validity. Given that
within-person inconsistencies are now considered as well, a
within-subject design was used.
Study 2
Method
Sample and Procedure
The sample consisted of 105 industrial and psychology students
who participated in Study 2 for course credit. These students were
in either their third or their fourth year of college. Among the
participants, 30% were male and 70% were female. Mean age was
21 years (SD  1 year). All students had considerable work
experience (student jobs, summer jobs). The mean number of jobs
was 4. A couple of weeks following participation, participants
received feedback about their test results via e-mail.
Design and Manipulations
Participants completed the personality scales with both an at-
school and an at-work frame of reference. These frames of refer-
ence were operationalized by adding context tags after each item
(see Schmit et al., 1995). In light of possible item order effects (see
Knowles, 1988) four different versions (with item order randomly
determined) were created.
Personality Scales
As the personality inventory would become very long if all
scales were rated with both an at-school and an at-work frame of
reference, Study 2 focused on the three scales (Conscientiousness,
Achievement Striving, and Self-Discipline) that were valid predic-
tors in academic settings in general and in Study 1 in particular.
The items of these three scales and the Likert-type rating scale
were exactly the same as in Study 1. Therefore, all participants
completed 60 items: 30 items with an at-school context and the
same 30 items with an at-work context. Per trait, a composite score
was computed by summing the items related to a given frame of
reference. Thus, two composite scores (at work and at school)
were computed per individual and per trait.
Criterion
Similar to Study 1, cumulative GPA served as the criterion
measure. GPA was measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 4, with
higher scores indicating better grades. Cumulative GPA was ob-
tained from all participants by self-report. In line with Study 1,
GPA correlated strongly across years (around .70).
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of Study 2 variables.
Similar to Study 1, use of an at-work frame of reference produced
significantly higher ratings than use of an at-school frame of
reference. The intercorrelation among the two frames of reference
was .46 ( p  .01) for Achievement Striving, .22 ( p  .05) for
Self-Discipline, and .49 ( p  .01) for Conscientiousness. Addi-
tionally, a multivariate analysis of variance showed no significant
multivariate effect of item order, F(18, 272)  1.13, ns, Wilks’s
lambda  .82.
Tests of Effects of Between-Person Variability
As shown in Table 4, there were significant differences in the
internal consistencies across the frames of reference used for all
three scales. Specifically, the scales rated with an at-school frame
of reference had significantly higher Cronbach alphas than did the
same scales rated with an at-work frame of reference. Significant
differences were determined on the basis of Feldt’s (1980) test.
These significant differences support neither the traditional nor the
alternative explanation, because both explanations posit that the
effects of frame of reference on reliability do not depend on the
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Study 2 Variables
Variable M SD  1 2 3 4 5 6
Predictors
1. Achievement, at work 39.62 5.20 .85a
2. Achievement, at school 33.00 7.29 .90b .46
3. Self-discipline, at work 38.68 5.36 .85a .74 .34
4. Self-discipline, at school 28.00 7.53 .91b .26 .72 .22
5. Conscientiousness, at work 38.52 5.25 .79a .68 .35 .79 .26
6. Conscientiousness, at school 33.29 7.27 .87b .44 .75 .41 .76 .49
Criterion
7. GPA 0.84 0.60 .29a .53b .13a .41b .05a .38b
Note. N  105. Alphas with different subscripts across the at-school and at-work conditions indicate significant differences at p  .05. These were
computed on the basis of the test in Feldt (1980). Correlations between the predictor and the criterion with different subscripts across the at-school and
at-work conditions indicate significant differences across conditions at p  .05. These were computed on the basis of the Z test in Meng, Rosenthal, and
Rubin (1992).
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frame of reference used. The significantly higher reliability of the
at-school frame of reference might stem from students being more
familiar with the at-school context and therefore possessing more
autobiographical memories of this context. A reason for the find-
ing of reliability differences in Study 2, and not in Study 1, might
be the stronger manipulation used in Study 2, as the within-subject
design of that study implied that context tags were added directly
after each item (as in Schmit et al., 1995), and students were asked
to complete all items twice with differing frames of reference.
Conversely, in Study 1, the context tag was mentioned only before
and during the administration of the items, and participants rated
each item once (as in Hunthausen et al., 2003).
According to the propositions of the alternative explanation,
between-person variability in the frame of reference adopted is
expected to impact on validity. In support of this explanation, the
validities of the conceptually relevant frame of reference (at
school) were significantly higher than the validities of the incorrect
frame of reference (at work). According to Meng, Rosenthal, and
Rubin’s (1992) Z test for the difference between dependent corre-
lations, this difference was statistically significant for Achieve-
ment Striving (Z  2.64, p  .01), Self-Discipline (Z  2.48,
p  .05), and Conscientiousness (Z  3.62, p  .01). Generally,
these results are consistent with the alternative explanation and
with the results of Study 1.
We also simulated the effects of the degree of between-person
variability in responding to generic items by randomly drawing
samples from the total sample (N  105) without replacement.
These random samples always consisted of the same 105 test
takers. However, they differed in terms of the percentages of test
takers who used a specific frame of reference. For example, one
might draw a random sample consisting of the ratings of 10% of
the sample on the at-school items (correct frame of reference) and
the ratings of 90% of the sample on the at-work items (incorrect
frame of reference). Table 5 summarizes the reliability and validity
effects of different scenarios of between-person variability in the
frame of reference used. For each scenario, 1,000 random samples
of N  105 were drawn. Generally, the effects of between-person
variability on validity were much larger than those on reliability.
For instance, the validity of Self-Discipline varied between .05
and .53, whereas its reliability varied between .85 and .95. Thus,
consistent with Study 1, these results support the alternative, rather
than the traditional, explanation.
Test of Effects of Within-Person Inconsistency
The alternative explanation posited that there would be a cur-
vilinear relationship between the number of items rated with a
specific frame of reference and reliability. The within-subject
design of Study 2 enabled examination of this hypothesis because
all individuals completed all items with both the at-school and
at-work frames of reference. Hence, it is possible to simulate the
reliability and validity effects of the degree of within-person
inconsistency by randomly sampling from the responses provided
by the participants of the total sample (N  105) without replace-
ment. Thus, these randomly drawn samples differed in terms of the
number of items rated with a specific frame of reference. Table 6
summarizes the reliability and validity effects of different scenar-
ios of within-person inconsistency. For instance, the second row
shows the results averaged across 1,000 random samples of N 
105, wherein all individuals rated two (randomly chosen) items
with an at-school (correct) frame of reference and the eight re-
maining items with an at-work (incorrect) frame of reference.
As shown in Table 6, a curvilinear pattern was apparent in the
relationship between the number of times that individuals used the
same frame of reference and reliability. That is, reliability was
highest when all individuals rated either a small number of items
with one specific frame of reference or a large number of items
with one specific frame of reference. Reliability was lowest when
all individuals rated about half of the items with one frame of
reference and the other half with another frame of reference.
Although this dip in reliability was observed across all three scales,
it was most noteworthy for Self-Discipline.
A different pattern was found for the effects of within-person
inconsistency in the frame of reference adopted on validity. Ac-
cording to the alternative explanation, the effects on validity would
be positively related to the number of items rated with the correct
Table 5
Summary of Reliability and Validity Results of Different Levels of Between-Persons Variability
Scenariosa
Reliability Validity
Achievement Self-discipline C Achievement Self-discipline C
10% participants at school, 90% at work .87 .89 .82 .31 .15 .11
20% participants at school, 80% at work .89 .91 .83 .31 .15 .11
30% participants at school, 70% at work .90 .92 .84 .35 .22 .18
40% participants at school, 60% at work .90 .92 .85 .38 .22 .22
50% participants at school, 50% at work .90 .93 .86 .36 .20 .21
60% participants at school, 40% at work .91 .93 .86 .40 .24 .26
70% participants at school, 30% at work .91 .92 .86 .42 .26 .28
80% participants at school, 20% at work .91 .92 .87 .45 .31 .30
90% participants at school, 10% at work .91 .91 .87 .49 .35 .34
M .90 .92 .85 .39 .23 .22
SD .02 .01 .02 .07 .08 .08
Minimum .86 .88 .80 .25 .09 .07
Maximum .93 .94 .89 .53 .45 .39
Note. C  Conscientiousness.
a For each of the nine scenarios, 1,000 random samples were drawn. Summary statistics at the bottom are computed across all 9,000 samples.
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frame of reference. Table 6 shows that validity was lowest when a
correct frame of reference was used for only a limited number of
items, whereas it was highest when a correct frame of reference
was used for a large number of items. Consistent with the alter-
native explanation, these results highlight that the amount of
conceptual overlap between the predictor and the criterion (as
indicated by the number of items rated with the correct frame of
reference) is a key determinant of validity.
Structural Equation Modeling Analyses
We also used structural equation modeling to test the models
associated with our two explanations. In these analyses, we were
especially interested in examining which paths of these models
(see Figure 1 and 2) were affected by the hypothesized sources of
inconsistency. First, we conducted multigroup confirmatory factor
analyses (CFAs) to test the measurement invariance of the model
related to between-person variability (Figure 1) across two groups:
a group of test takers who rated items with an at-work frame of
reference and a group who rated items with an at-school frame of
reference. To this end, data from both Study 1 and Study 2 were
used. Across all analyses (available from Filip Lievens), only
minor departures of measurement invariance were observed. For
some traits, the path coefficient to GPA was found to be nonin-
variant across groups. These structural equation modeling analyses
do not support the traditional explanation, as reliability was not
affected. Between-person variability had effects only on validity.
A similar strategy was applied to test which paths were affected
by within-person inconsistency (see model in Figure 2). Multi-
group CFAs were conducted across two samples: (a) a randomly
drawn sample wherein test takers rated 5 of the 10 at-school items
with an at-work frame of reference and 5 of the 10 at-work items
with an at-school frame of reference (moderate within-person
inconsistency; see Table 6) and (b) a sample wherein test takers
rated all 10 at-school items with an at-school frame of reference
and all 10 at-work items with an at-work frame of reference (no
within-person inconsistency). These analyses could be conducted
only with Study 2 data. Substantial departures of measurement
invariance were observed. For all traits, the factor covariance was
found to be noninvariant. In particular, in the sample with mod-
erate within-person inconsistency, the covariance between the two
factors was much higher. In addition, 10 error variances related to
both factors were found to be noninvariant, as they were much
higher in the sample with moderate within-person inconsistency.
These results show that the two factors became much more error-
laden, as they were both determined by 5 at-work and 5 at-school
items. Thus, consistent with the alternative explanation, within-
person inconsistency had a major impact on reliability. The mea-
surement error caused by within-person inconsistency translated to
the substantive relationships among the factors and GPA. Results
obtained with other levels of within-person inconsistency (avail-
able from Filip Lievens) confirmed this conclusion.
Taken together, results of Study 2 confirmed and refined many
of the findings of Study 1. We found that reducing between-person
variability through imposing a frame of reference does not lead to
higher reliability. In addition, reduction of between-person vari-
ability through a frame of reference had beneficial effects on
validity only when a correct frame of reference was imposed on a
large number of test takers. In addition, Study 2 extended the
findings of Study 1 by investigating the impact of within-person
inconsistency on reliability and validity. Within-person inconsis-
tency affected the reliability of personality scales. In turn, this had
an effect on the validity of these scales. Reliability was highest
when test takers interpreted a large number of items with a specific
(either correct or incorrect) frame of reference. Validity was re-
lated to test takers’ interpreting a large number of items with a
correct frame of reference.
General Discussion
This article adds several key findings to the literature on the use
of a frame of reference in personality scales. Most importantly, it
contributes to our understanding of why imposing a specific frame
of reference might lead to increased validity. In addition, factors
Table 6
Summary of Reliability and Validity Results of Different Levels of Within-Person Inconsistency
Scenariosa
Reliability Validity
Achievement Self-discipline C Achievement Self-discipline C
1 at-school item, 9 at-work items .81 .76 .76 .34 .18 .10
2 at-school items, 8 at-work items .78 .69 .74 .38 .24 .15
3 at-school items, 7 at-work items .77 .64 .73 .42 .28 .19
4 at-school items, 6 at-work items .76 .63 .73 .46 .32 .23
5 at-school items, 5 at-work items .77 .65 .74 .48 .36 .27
6 at-school items, 4 at-work items .79 .69 .77 .50 .38 .30
7 at-school items, 3 at-work items .82 .74 .79 .51 .40 .33
8 at-school items, 2 at-work items .85 .80 .82 .52 .41 .35
9 at-school items, 1 at-work item .88 .85 .84 .52 .41 .36
M .80 .72 .77 .46 .33 .25
SD .04 .08 .04 .06 .08 .09
Minimum .70 .53 .68 .28 .12 .04
Maximum .89 .87 .86 .57 .47 .41
Note. C  Conscientiousness.
a For each of the nine scenarios, 1,000 random samples were drawn. Summary statistics at the bottom are computed across all 9,000 samples. Per sample,
the specific items rated with a frame of reference were not fixed across participants.
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that might impact on the reliability and validity of noncontextual-
ized and contextualized personality scales were revealed.
First, this article shows that imposing a frame of reference in
personality inventories enables the reduction of within-person in-
consistency in responding to generic items. Reliability was highest
when respondents interpreted a large number of items with the
same frame of reference. Conversely, it was lowest when respon-
dents switched their frame of reference for many of the items.
Study 2 also provided evidence that reducing within-person incon-
sistency had larger effects on reliability than reducing between-
person variability in item responding. This was most clearly shown
by our additional structural equation modeling analyses. In addi-
tion, when the degree of within-person inconsistency was varied,
reliabilities differed from .53 to .87 for Self-Discipline, whereas
when the degree of between person variability was varied, reli-
abilities ranged from .85 to .95. In Study 1, between-person
variability had negligible effects on reliability. Taken together,
these reliability results shed a new and different light on the source
of measurement error that is reduced by using a frame of reference.
In particular, our findings highlight the importance of using a
frame of reference as a vehicle for reducing within-person incon-
sistency, as within-person inconsistency makes the traits much
more error-laden. Our results do not support the traditional expla-
nation that use of a frame of reference reduces between-person
variability.
As a second contribution, this study provides insight into factors
that might explain why the validity of contextualized personality
inventories is higher than that of their noncontextualized counter-
parts. The reduction of both between-person variability and within-
person inconsistency seems to play a role. For instance, in both
studies, reducing between-person variability led to a significant
increase in validity. Similarly, in Study 2, reduction of within-
person inconsistency increased validity. However, simply impos-
ing a frame of reference is not enough. It is equally important to
ensure that test takers adopt a frame of reference that conceptually
overlaps with the criterion. This is evidenced by the fact that
validity was increased in both studies only when between-person
variability was reduced in such a way that the contextualization
matched the criterion (in this case, the at-school contextualization)
for conceptually relevant traits. Likewise, in Study 2, reducing
within-person inconsistency increased validity when respondents
interpreted a large number of items with a correct frame of refer-
ence.
More generally, these results confirm Schmidt et al.’s (2000)
treatment of reliability and validity. According to Schmidt et al.,
reliability refers to a measurement model, specifically, to consis-
tency in measurement (regardless of what is measured). Con-
versely, validity refers to a substantive process model. This study
provides evidence that reducing between-person variability in the
frame of reference used does not suffice to obtain high validity, as
attested by the consistently low validity for the at-work frame-of-
reference condition. In order to increase validity, it is also impor-
tant to reduce between-person variability in such a way that the
contextualization imposed matches the criterion. The same reason-
ing applies to the within-person inconsistencies. Reducing those
inconsistencies in the frame of reference adopted is not enough for
obtaining high validity. For example, Table 6 (first rows) shows
that high reliability might be coupled with low validity even when
frames of reference are imposed. When one reduces within-person
inconsistency, it is also key to ensure that test takers interpret items
with a frame of reference that is conceptually relevant to the
criterion. Thus, it is important to reduce measurement error in such
a way that the conceptual meaning of the latent factor better
matches the criterion. Only when this substantive issue is taken
into account is validity increased.
With regard to substantive issues, the large difference in the
validity coefficients for the two frames of reference (at school vs.
at work) deserves some attention. One explanation might be that
for students, these two frames of reference represent radically
different situations and perspectives. This is confirmed by the
moderate correlation among the two frames of reference in Study
2. As another explanation, the primary reason for the correlation
between Conscientiousness-related factors at school and GPA
might be direct causality, whereas the primary reason for the
correlation between Conscientiousness-related factors at work and
GPA might be that Conscientiousness-related factors at work
correlate strongly with Conscientiousness-related factors at school,
which, in turn, causes GPA. If this were true, then the correlation
between Conscientiousness-related factors at work and GPA
would equal the correlation between the two contextualizations of
Conscientiousness-related factors multiplied by the correlation be-
tween Conscientiousness-related factors at school and GPA. In-
spection of Table 3 shows that this is the case for both Achieve-
ment Striving (.46  .53  .24, whereas the value is .29 in Table
4) and Self-Discipline (.22  .41  .09, whereas the value is .13
in Table 4). Future research should delve deeper into these expla-
nations.
Third, our studies are the first to actually show that the use of an
incorrect frame of reference decreases validity. Moreover, both
studies demonstrate that validity might vary to a large extent
depending on the frame of reference used. For instance, in Study
2, the validity of Conscientiousness was as low as .05 and as high
as .38. These are important findings because they exemplify what
might happen if candidates self-contextualize generic items and
(sometimes) use an incorrect frame of reference for answering
them. Accordingly, our findings might constitute one explanation
for the low to moderate validities of generic personality invento-
ries. These findings also reinforce the importance of using con-
textualized inventories.
This study is not without limitations. First, its generalizability to
an employment context might be questioned. A laboratory setting
was used because it is difficult to conduct the manipulations (i.e.,
an incorrect frame of reference) in the field. If we would have
asked actual applicants to use an incorrect frame of reference,
perhaps this might have led to legal challenges. In a similar vein,
it should be acknowledged that GPA served as the criterion.
Therefore, future research should examine whether our results
generalize to employment settings, with job performance as the
criterion. It is worth noting, however, that much validation work in
employment settings is against training criteria. As another limi-
tation, our sample consisted of a restricted group of students. It can
be expected that these students were high on Conscientiousness, as
they had already successfully passed several academic years. In
Study 1, they had even self-selected to attend the test preparation
session. Despite this possible range restriction, differential validity
effects were found.
The results of the current study prompt various intriguing di-
rections for future research. First, it is important to better under-
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stand how respondents complete generic personality inventories.
In this article, we assumed that generic items led to between-
person variability and within-person inconsistency in the frame of
reference adopted. However, we have no information about the
prevalence of these inconsistencies. We also showed what might
happen if test takers switched between two frames of reference.
Apart from the at-school frame of reference, we selected the
at-work frame of reference because this context is also relevant for
students. However, existing research provides no insight into how
many frames of reference test takers typically use. To shed light on
these issues in responding to generic items, think-aloud or policy-
capturing studies might be fruitfully conducted. In a similar vein,
mixture item response theory models might be used to group test
takers in latent classes (Eid & Langeheine, 1999; Zickar et al.,
2004). Alternatively, Monte Carlo simulations might be conducted
to examine the impact of multiple frames of reference (which vary
in their intercorrelation, measurement error, etc.) on reliability and
validity.
Second, one might wonder whether further increasing the con-
textualization of personality scales might lead to even higher
criterion-related validities. According to this perspective, adding
an at-work or an at-school tag is just the beginning. On the basis
of the behavioral consistency model that is typically used in
sample-based predictors, one might expect that adding more con-
text would lead to even higher criterion-related validities. Alter-
natively, one might posit that the level of specificity in the pre-
dictor should be mapped with the level of specificity in the
criterion. This would mean that using a narrower context in the
predictor limits the generality of the predictions made. Although
these questions are related to the bandwidth-fidelity trade-off
(Cronbach, 1960), they could invoke some intriguing future re-
search.
Third, one might also contrast this recent move to contextual-
ized personality scales to a reverse development in sample-based
predictors, such as situational judgment tests. In fact, there is
growing interest to develop construct-oriented situational judg-
ment tests (Motowidlo, Hooper, & Jackson, 2006). These tests
present a job-related situation to candidates. As compared with
contextualized personality inventories, this situation is much more
detailed. Yet, similar to personality inventories and contrary to
traditional situational judgment tests, the response alternatives are
carefully developed to reflect different degrees of a given construct
(e.g., Agreeableness). Situation-response inventories (e.g., Born,
1994; Furnham & Jaspars, 1983) constitute another alternative
format that has some correspondence with contextualized person-
ality inventories. Future research should compare the validity of
these formats while holding the construct measured constant.
In conclusion, prior research ascribed the increase in reliability
and validity of contextualized personality inventories to a reduc-
tion of inconsistencies among test takers. However, it was unclear
what type of inconsistency was reduced. The current study ad-
vances prior research on the use of a frame of reference in
personality inventories by testing two competing explanations.
Results confirmed the alternative explanation, showing that reli-
ability was affected by within-person inconsistency and that
criterion-related validity was affected by between-person variabil-
ity (the number of test-takers using a correct frame of reference)
and within-person inconsistency (the number of items rated with a
correct frame of reference) in item responding.
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